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 *Comp. Law. 139  Introduction  
The Companies Act 2006 s.439A highlights shareholders as being responsible for 
monitoring directors’ remuneration by providing that quoted companies should put their 
directors’ remuneration policy to a three-year binding vote of shareholders. The 
implementation part of the remuneration report should be subject to an annual 
shareholder non-binding vote. Director remuneration emerged as a controversial issue 
during the early 1990s. Directors of privatised utility companies received pay increases 
which were condemned by the public and the media as having no corresponding link to the 
performance of the company. The criticism of directors’ pay by the public and the media 
came under headlines such as "Fat Cats in the Dock",1 "Executive Gluttony under Attack"2 
and "Derailing the Gravy Train".3 More than two decades later, directors’ pay continues to 
be a prominent issue of corporate governance in the UK. First, there is continued concern 
that directors are receiving excessive pay packages with no corresponding link to company 
performance.4 Secondly, directors’ pay seems to be increasing even when company 
performance5 is falling. Thirdly, directors’ pay (bankers’ bonuses) was considered as partly 
responsible for the financial crisis in 20086; and lastly, the pay gap between directors and 
average employees of the company continues to widen.7 
The objective of giving members of the company voting rights on remuneration issues is for 
members to be able to hold the directors to account over the structure and levels of 
directors’ remuneration. This voting right enables the members to prevent reward for 
failure and make sure that pay is more closely linked to company performance. Members’ 
vote on directors’ remuneration may also increase transparency in remuneration reporting, 
as it indicates what directors are earning and how it is linked to the company’s strategy and 
performance. It is also intended to encourage a stronger relationship between the 
company and its members. If the shareholders vote against the remuneration report, the 
remuneration committee would have to redress the situation by reconsidering how the 
remuneration package was set. 
 
 Shareholders’ vote before the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
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2013  
Under s.439 of the CA 2006, shareholders were entitled to a non-binding vote on the 
remuneration report. This meant that if the shareholders voted down the remuneration 
policy of a company, that company was not compelled to act on it. An example is Grainger 
Plc: in 2010 the shareholders voted down the company’s remuneration report on the 
grounds that a £2.9 million payoff offered to the former CEO of the company was too 
generous, but the company did not reduce the payoff. Even though companies were not 
compelled to act on the non-binding votes, many companies did react to the shareholders’ 
votes cast against the remuneration report to correct the point of disagreement. This was 
because members of the company could pass an ordinary resolution to remove the 
directors if they were not satisfied with their performance.8 
Table 1 gives examples of companies whose remuneration reports were voted down by the 
shareholders and the reaction of the company to that effect. The table also details the 
principal issue that caused the remuneration report to be voted down, and whether the 
company reacted to the shareholders’ votes (if any changes were made). *Comp. Law. 
140   
 
Table 1: Voted down remuneration reports from 2003 to 2013 
 
Company 
 
Year 
 
Principal issue 
 
Reaction 
 
GlaxoSmithKline 
 
2003 
 
£22 million severance 
payment to the then 
CEO. 
 
The remuneration 
committee was 
replaced and the CEO 
termination 
provisions reduced. 
 
Aegis Group 
 
2004 
 
24 months’ service 
contract. 
 
CEO resigned, and 
the contract term 
reduced. 
 
United Business 
Media 
 
2005 
 
£250,000 retirement 
bonus. 
 
Money voluntarily 
handed back to the 
company by the CEO. 
 
Goshawk Insurance 
 
2005 
 
£100,000 payment 
made to the CEO. 
 
None. 
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MFI Furniture Group 
 
2005 
 
A parachute clause of 
18 months liquidated 
damages. 
 
Provision removed 
from the 
remuneration policy. 
 
Lonmin 
 
2005 
 
£500,000 ex gratia 
bonus to a retiring 
non-executive. 
 
None. 
 
Croda International 
 
2006 
 
CEO’s contract 
provided for 
termination payment 
in excess of one 
year’s salary and 
benefit. 
 
CEO’s contract 
reviewed. 
 
Bellway 
 
2008 
 
Bonuses paid despite 
not meeting targets 
set. 
 
More objective future 
arrangements made 
although the 
remuneration 
committee still have 
some discretion over 
it. 
 
 RBS  
 
2009 
 
Large pension for 
outgoing CEO while 
the company was 
experiencing a £40 
billion loss. 
 
Pension payment 
re-negotiated and 
resulted in a lump 
sum payment. 
 
Shell 
 
2009 
 
Awarding bonuses as 
part of LTI despite 
missing performance 
targets. 
 
Additional 
performance 
measures introduced 
in the remuneration 
policy. 
 
Provident Financial 
 
2009 
 
High base salary 
increase for its 
executives and 
None. 
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introduction of 
deferred bonuses. 
 
Punch Taverns 
 
2009 
 
Increased pension 
contributions and 9 
times basic salary as 
payoff to departing 
directors. 
 
Increased 
communication with 
shareholders. 
 
Grainger 
 
2010 
 
£2.9 million payoff to 
former CEO. 
 
None. 
 
SIG 
 
2010 
 
Increase in CEO’s 
basic salary. 
 
None. 
 
21st Century 
Technology 
 
2010 
 
Generous bonuses to 
its directors. 
 
None. 
 
Easyjet 
 
2011 
 
£1 million fixed cash 
payment to the CEO. 
 
The CEO left the 
company. 
 
Robert Walters 
 
2011 
 
Awarded bonuses 
above its 
self-imposed 
guidelines. 
 
None. 
 
Aviva 
 
2012 
 
Increase in CEO basic 
pay and "golden 
handshake" bonus to 
new executives 
 
Review of "golden 
handshake" 
packages, and CEO 
stood down. 
 
Cairn’s Ernergy 
 
2012 
 
Bonus pay of £3 
million to the 
chairman. 
 
Chairman voted out; 
increased dialogue 
with shareholders 
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WPP 
 
2012 
 
Increase in pay 
packet of CEO. 
 
None. 
 
Pendragon 
 
2012 
 
Proposal to raise 
performance related 
pay to 150% of base 
salary. 
 
Remuneration policy 
was not 
implemented; further 
consultations made 
with the 
shareholders. 
 
City of London 
Investment Group Plc 
 
2013 
 
Payment to former 
CEO and finance 
officers leaving the 
company after three 
months of service. 
 
None. 
 
As shown in Table 1, 22 companies saw their remuneration report voted down within the 
period 2003–2013. About 59 per cent of the 22 companies reacted to the shareholders’ 
remuneration votes, demonstrating that even though the shareholder vote was 
non-binding, companies still reacted to it, consequently influencing the pay-setting process 
of the company. Some companies still changed their remuneration policy even after the 
remuneration policy was approved. For example, in 2009 the shareholders of Marks & 
Spencer’s voted against the re-election of Louise Patten, the then chairman of the RC, after 
the company saw 10.41 per cent of votes cast against the remuneration report and 89.59 
per cent *Comp. Law. 141  votes cast in favour of the remuneration report.9 This 
therefore implies that, although shareholder votes were non-binding, they had a notable 
impact on the remuneration-setting process as the directors were trying to avoid 
shareholders voting against their re-election in the annual general meeting. 
The CA 2006 requires the results of shareholder voting in the annual general meeting to be 
published on the company’s website.10 Companies need to disclose votes for and against, 
and withheld votes, on all resolutions.11 Before 2013, companies were not required to 
disclose withheld votes, making it difficult to assess shareholder involvement in the 
remuneration-setting process. This disclosure of withheld votes, particularly on resolutions 
on directors’ remuneration, will make it easy to assess shareholder engagement in 
monitoring this remuneration. The percentages of the votes for and against published on 
the company’s website are calculated based on the total votes cast for and against the 
remuneration report and do not include the withheld votes. This means that companies 
with a high percentage of votes in favour of their remuneration report could have a 
significant number of withheld votes, which could mean many things. For example, if at the 
time the shareholder vote on the remuneration report was non-binding, withdrawal from 
voting could mean that shareholders are against the remuneration report but do not see 
the need to vote because directors were not obliged to react on it. It could also mean that 
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shareholders did not want to get involved in the directors’ remuneration issues. This 
second assumption could be supported by the fact that some of the companies used to 
have more withheld votes on the remuneration report than shareholder votes on any other 
resolution in the same annual general meeting. For example, in 2010, Tesco Plc recorded 
abstention votes of 741,134,361 on the remuneration report, and the highest abstention 
votes on other resolutions were just 64,244,132. Morrision Plc in 2006 saw abstention 
votes on the remuneration report of 400,565,945, and the second highest abstention votes 
on one of the company’s resolutions was just 19,183,330. Between 2003 and 2013, most 
of the FTSE 100 companies had more than 70 per cent of votes in favour of the 
remuneration report, despite the fact that directors’ pay levels continued to increase. For 
example, FTSE 100 directors experienced a 50 per cent pay rise in the year 2010,12 and 
the British prime minister, David Cameron, reacted by calling on the big companies to be 
more transparent when they were deciding on directors’ pay.13 Directors’ remuneration 
has even been termed as "corrosive" to the UK economy.14 The scepticism expressed by 
the Cadbury Committee in 1992 over the shareholders’ ability to monitor and curb 
directors’ remuneration seems to be upheld by the fact that shareholders simply did not 
want to vote on directors’ remuneration despite the fact that their votes had an impact on 
directors’ pay. 
Furthermore, some of the companies experienced abstention votes that were more than 
the votes cast against the remuneration report. For example, in 2009, the voting of the 
shareholders of Antofagasta on the remuneration report revealed that 930,856,310 votes 
were cast in favour of the remuneration report, 10,366,043 votes against and 106,877,823 
abstentions. The abstentions were more than 10 times the votes cast against. Disclosing 
this information could make the company’s directors consider why more than 10 times the 
number of shareholders who voted against abstained from voting. The point to note here is 
that the withheld votes on the remuneration report were more than the withheld votes on 
other resolutions for that company. This result could mean that the shareholders did not 
want to get involved in director remuneration matters generally, or that they did not see 
the need to vote considering that voting outcome was non-binding. 
In a study carried out by Ian Gregory-Smith et al.,15 they considered abstention votes to 
broadly mean dissenting votes in remuneration report resolutions. They made this 
assumption as many shareholders felt reluctant to vote considering that the company was 
not compelled to act on the outcome of the vote. Consequently, shareholders 
demonstrated this dissatisfaction and frustration with an act of withdrawal, as they felt that 
voting or withdrawal did not have any effect on the implementation of the remuneration 
policy. Gregory-Smith et al. worked with the dissent (votes against and abstention votes) 
to find out the effect of shareholder outrage on directors’ pay. They found out that 
shareholder dissent did not have an impact on the levels of directors’ pay. This contention 
of attributing abstention votes to dissent votes was followed by BIS.16 BIS17 pointed out 
that it was common for shareholders to abstain from voting on remuneration report to 
signal their dissatisfaction. It went further to say that abstention votes were very important 
as they could represent a large number of shareholders refusing to vote for the 
remuneration report. The consultation paper also indicated that  
"between 2007 and 2011, there were 11 companies in the FTSE All-Share Index that saw 
50% of votes cast going against the remuneration report, but including abstention shows 
that 19 companies actually failed to get a simple majority of all *Comp. Law. 
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142  shareholders. In one FTSE 250 example, the company ostensibly received 97% 
support for its remuneration report at the 2011 AGM. However, a closer look at the figures 
shows that a substantial number of shareholders abstained and taking this into account, 
almost one third of shareholders failed to back the report".18 
 If this assumption of Ian Gregory-Smith and BIS is true, then the number of abstention 
votes would be expected to reduce with the provision of the new law giving the 
shareholders a binding vote on remuneration policy. 
Even though non-binding shareholder votes had a huge impact because of directors’ fear 
that shareholders could vote against their re-election in the annual general meeting, it was 
not enough to motivate the shareholders to engage in the monitoring of directors’ 
remuneration. Since the introduction of the non-binding shareholder vote on the 
remuneration report there was not much downward adjustment in remuneration level. 
Directors’ remuneration continued to increase on a yearly basis. Table 2 indicates directors’ 
pay increases between 2002 and 2014, which represents the period within which 
shareholders had been voting on the directors’ remuneration report. 
 
Table 2: Trend of directors’ pay rise from 2002 to 2014 
 
year 
 
Percentage (%) increase 
 
2002 
 
2319 
 
2003 
 
1320 
 
2004 
 
1621 
 
2005 
 
2822 
 
2006 
 
3723 
 
2009 
 
1024 
 
2010 5525 
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2011 
 
4926 
 
2012 
 
1227 
 
2013 
 
1428 
 
2014 
 
1529 
 
The table indicates that directors’ remuneration has continued to increase over the sample 
period. However, the highest pay increases were seen in 2010, with a 55 per cent increase, 
and 2011, with a 49 per cent pay increase. There are no hard facts or evidence to justify the 
high pay increases. However, the study by Ferri and Maber30 on the effect of the 
non-binding shareholders’ vote and CEO pay revealed that shareholders’ say on pay 
reduced "reward for failure" by strengthening the pay-performance relationship.31 This 
finding demonstrated the fact that, even though the shareholders’ vote was non-binding 
and companies were not compelled to act on it, companies still acted upon the outcome of 
the vote. One reason why companies reacted on the voting outcome was because the 
shareholders could vote against their re-election in the AGM if they were dissatisfied with 
the directors’ performance. Therefore, directors acted on the shareholder vote on the 
remuneration report as a security measure to prevent the shareholders from voting against 
their re-election. The study by Carter and Zamora32 suggested that the board responded 
to shareholder votes by strengthening the pay for performance link, but not changing the 
salary. Although the shareholder vote was only an advisory vote, evidence suggests that 
voting on the remuneration report had an influence on the determination of company’s 
directors’ remuneration. As demonstrated in Table 1, most of the companies responded to 
the shareholder votes by reviewing the remuneration policy where necessary. Deloitte’s33 
study on the impact of the non-binding shareholders’ vote found that there had been 
enhanced disclosure and accountability by the companies on remuneration issues, with 
some changes in policies and practices on directors’ remuneration (e.g. a greater 
percentage of the directors’ pay package made up of more performance related pay). 
There has been a significant increase in the level of variable pay in companies, with 
meaningful performance conditions attached to incentive remuneration in the UK because 
of shareholders’ say on pay. Most companies replaced share options with share grants tied 
to performance, with a drop in pay-out for average performance in response to investor 
pressure.34 Limits to *Comp. Law. 143  the amount of share options any one director 
may be granted and golden parachute packages shrank to the equivalent of one year’s pay. 
The quality of reporting on pay improved, with more explanation and disclosure.35 
However, there seemed to be no corresponding leap forward in company performance, 
which was described by Ed Miliband, the then leader of the Labour Party in the UK, as a 
"something for nothing".36 Carter and Zamora37 found that shareholders disapproved of 
    Page9 
higher salaries and weak pay for performance sensitivity in bonus pay, and in response 
companies responded to negative shareholder votes by reducing excess salary and 
improving the pay-performance relationship. Companies react to adverse shareholder 
votes on the remuneration report in different ways. This indicates that although 
shareholders’ voting powers were non-binding, they had a great impact on the 
remuneration determination process. 
 
 Shareholder voting after 2013  
The response to the non-binding shareholder vote was not impressive (as noted above, 
only 22 remuneration reports were voted down within the period 2003–2013). It was 
argued that there was therefore a need to strengthen shareholders’ voting rights in order 
to encourage shareholder activism in directors’ remuneration. 
Section 439A of the Companies Act 2006 requires that the remuneration policy of quoted 
companies be approved by the members of the company by an ordinary resolution. The 
outcome of the shareholders’ non-binding vote was not very impressive, and the 
Government wanted to improve shareholder involvement in voting on directors’ pay by 
giving the shareholders a binding vote on remuneration policy. 
Shareholders have been given a binding vote only on the policy part of the remuneration 
report. The policy part of the remuneration report sets out the remuneration policy of each 
director for the future. All quoted companies are required to give notice to their members 
of their intention to move an ordinary resolution to approve the directors’ remuneration 
policy at the annual general meeting.38 The main aim of the binding votes on 
remuneration policy is to encourage better-quality engagement between companies and 
shareholders at an early stage in the process of devising policy.39 Quoted companies are 
expected to seek shareholder approval on the remuneration policy at least every three 
years, or at the next meeting following the one where the advisory vote on the 
remuneration report was not passed,40 or where the remuneration policy has been 
amended.41 
The original BIS consultation paper42 was for the shareholder vote to take place annually. 
This was changed to three-yearly when the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
was passed. The proposal of a one-year voting right was watered down by BIS with the 
hope that allowing companies and shareholders the option of agreeing a three-year 
remuneration policy would encourage longer-term thinking on pay.43 Companies will also 
have the option of an annual vote if that is what the companies and shareholders want.44 
Annual votes as opposed to three-yearly votes might destabilise management teams and 
encourage short-term thinking, which would consequently affect the long-term success of 
the company.45 Annual voting might cause shareholders to be more cautious about voting 
against pay schemes to avoid a destabilised management, thereby risking their 
investments in the company.46 This three-year flexibility over binding votes would allow 
companies to demonstrate how remuneration is aligned with company strategy.47 
Furthermore, three-yearly shareholder voting is intended to link pay to the success of the 
company as a whole and reduce the annual ratcheting up of pay.48 
This deviation from the original proposal has been criticised49 on the grounds that 
shareholder activism will be diluted in the long run, and a three-yearly remuneration report 
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might be difficult for shareholders to understand in terms of what directors were paid 
annually and why. The Labour Party criticised the deviation on the grounds that the 
three-yearly shareholder vote would not achieve the purpose of giving shareholders a 
binding vote on pay. It was argued that the shareholders’ vote on pay should be held 
annually to be able "to hold directors’ feet to the fire and ensure there is constant 
engagement with shareholders".50 More worries were expressed that such votes might 
degenerate into a box-ticking exercise, with *Comp. Law. 144  shareholders voting on 
vague policies rather than policies on specific elements.51 Furthermore, it was argued52 
that the administrative costs involved in arranging a general meeting for the board to 
re-submit a remuneration report that had failed might cause shareholders to vote in favour 
of remuneration polices just to avoid the cost. This is a change that could be regarded as 
unmerited because the three-yearly binding vote might not be able to curb director 
remuneration as expected. The three-yearly binding vote on remuneration policy might 
make companies draw up policies that are broad and generous as a means of avoiding any 
significant changes to the remuneration policy that might require a shareholder vote within 
the three years.53 This reaction by the directors could only lead to greater increases in 
remuneration levels. Furthermore, within three years directors might have come and gone 
from the company. If the shareholders do not approve the remuneration report, the 
company is required to continue to use the last approved remuneration policy and seek a 
separate approval for any specific remuneration or loss of office payment which are not 
consistent with the policy; or call another meeting and put the remuneration policy to 
shareholder approval.54 Companies are required to abide by the approved remuneration 
policy and to change it only with the approval of the shareholders. Any director of the 
company who goes contrary to this provision would be liable to account to the company for 
any loss, and the director who receives any payment must hold it on trust for the 
company.55 
The BIS consultation paper56 on directors’ pay suggested that a threshold of between 50 
and 75 per cent of the shareholder vote be required in favour of the remuneration policy 
before it can be approved. 
However, the BIS proposals were criticised by the CBI, which warned that giving the 
shareholders too many voting rights would be damaging, as strategic decision-making 
would be left in the hands of the minority rather than the majority.57 It argued that giving 
the shareholders a 75 per cent vote on remuneration policy would mean that 
decision-making about the company strategy would be in the hands of a minority of 
shareholders who might not represent the wider group of shareholders. The Government 
also recognised that, in a very small number of UK quoted companies, a single shareholder 
owns 25 per cent or more of the total share value and could, potentially, singlehandedly 
reject a special resolution on remuneration policy. 
Considering the analysis made above on the effect of the non-binding shareholder vote, it 
could be argued that a 75 per cent shareholder voting right might not have made any 
difference to the ordinary shareholder resolution on directors’ remuneration policy. This is 
because the percentage of the votes cast for or against the remuneration report were 
calculated only based on the total number of votes cast for and against the remuneration 
report. Abstention votes were not included, which as seen earlier were very high in some 
companies. Consequently most of the companies recorded votes in favour of the 
remuneration report of more than 75 per cent. For example, a study conducted by 
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Deloitte58 revealed that, in 2013, all the FTSE 100 companies received more than 75 per 
cent votes in favour of their remuneration policies. The problem faced by shareholder 
voting is simply the fact that shareholders do not want to be involved in directors’ 
remuneration, and it is not about the nature or level of voting percentage required to pass 
a resolution on directors’ remuneration. 
Although shareholders have been highlighted by the Companies Act 2006 as being 
responsible for the monitoring of directors’ remuneration, the effect of the binding 
shareholder vote has not been different from the effect of the non-binding shareholder 
vote. Although the binding shareholder vote forms part of the major changes on directors’ 
remuneration made by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, its effect on 
remuneration levels has not been different from the shareholders’ voting attitude 
experienced when shareholders had only a non-binding vote on the remuneration report. 
As discussed above, the non-binding vote had a notable impact on directors’ remuneration, 
but the problem was shareholder non-activism. Even though binding shareholder votes 
mean that the company must act on the outcome of the voting, the voting outcome has 
been the same as with the non-binding vote, and shareholders’ engagement does not seem 
to have improved. It is two years since shareholders were given a binding vote on directors’ 
remuneration policy and a non-binding vote on the implementation report. However, since 
the introduction of the binding shareholder votes on directors’ remuneration policy, one 
company (Kentz Plc in 2014)59 saw both its remuneration policy and remuneration report 
voted down by the company’s shareholders. The shareholders of Burberry Plc in 2014 also 
voted down its remuneration report even though the votes were non-binding.60 Apart from 
these two companies, most of the FTSE 100 companies received more than 75 per cent 
*Comp. Law. 145  of votes in favour of their remuneration policy and the remuneration 
report. However, the same shareholder voting attitude witnessed when the shareholder 
vote was only non-binding is still repeating itself, even with the binding shareholder vote. 
Shareholders continue to abstain from voting on directors’ remuneration. Although 
shareholders may have many reasons to abstain from voting on a resolution, the number 
of abstentions on directors’ remuneration tends to suggest that shareholders do not 
generally want to be involved in this remuneration. For example, in 2014, Antofagasta Plc 
saw abstention votes of 30,654,717 and the second highest abstention votes the company 
saw in other resolutions was 4,341,604. Also in 2015, Tesco Plc saw abstention votes of 
444,864,254 for its remuneration report and 473,362,689 for its remuneration policy, 
followed by only 41,064,289 abstention votes on another resolution. This article argues 
that, although the Companies Act 2006 highlights the shareholders as being responsible for 
the monitoring and curbing of excessive directors’ remuneration, the shareholders are 
unwilling to be involved in matters of director remuneration. Consequently, the desired 
outcome of shareholders influencing directors’ remuneration has not been achieved. The 
Cadbury Committee’s61 scepticism over giving shareholders more powers on 
remuneration issues is seen to be justified. They predicted that many of the shareholders 
would simply abstain from voting, and those that voted would defer in almost every case to 
the judgment of directors and the remuneration committee. 
 
 Reasons why shareholders cannot effectively monitor directors’ 
remuneration  
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Shareholders’ abstention from engaging in directors’ remuneration could be explained in 
terms of the quantity of share ownership, the difficulty in understanding the complexity of 
the remuneration package and the factors that drive remuneration levels generally. 
 
Ownership of UK shares 
The binding shareholder vote given to the shareholders under the CA 2006 represents an 
important mechanism of the shareholders’ voice in the UK. This is to enable shareholders of 
quoted companies to have a direct voice on the determination of directors’ pay. The 
increased power given to the shareholders is aimed at encouraging the engagement of the 
shareholders in decision-making on directors’ pay, and also at improving dialogue between 
the shareholders and the directors. However, the shareholders need to understand the 
remuneration report in order to be able to make an informed decision when voting on 
remuneration issues. Directors’ remuneration packages are complex in nature, and the 
remuneration report will be made up of expert knowledge and terminology. For a 
shareholder to fully understand the remuneration report, they will have to either possess 
the expert knowledge or pay for experts to read and interpret the report for them. This 
comes at a cost to the shareholders, as many of them lack the time and expertise needed 
to understand the report. Consequently, an average shareholder who owns a small 
percentage of the company’s shares will need to incur the cost (time and money to pay 
experts to interpret the report) to be able to make an informed decision on the 
remuneration policy when voting or, as is most likely, will simply abstain from voting.62 
Shareholders who do not understand the remuneration process would probably only look at 
the level of remuneration and what they get as dividends in order to cast a vote for or 
against a remuneration report. This means that for the shareholder to have a reasonable 
understanding of the remuneration report, information must be disclosed and in a way that 
will ease his or her understanding. The 21st-century remuneration packages have 
developed to become more complex and technical as opposed to the past century’s 
remuneration packages. The complexity and technicality of these remuneration packages 
almost defeats the very purpose of the disclosure requirements, which was to provide 
shareholders with information on directors’ remuneration. This complexity of the 
remuneration package is further compounded by the drivers of directors’ remuneration, 
which include directors’ peer benchmarking, the use of incentive pay, board independence, 
etc. 
The remuneration committee and remuneration consultants have expert knowledge in the 
field, and they have spent a lot of time on this, meaning that it cannot be easily understood 
by shareholders unless they have some expert knowledge or pay experts to explain the 
remuneration report to them. Further, before the enactment of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013, the absence of a standard format disclosure meant that 
companies could swamp shareholders with complex information. 
Furthermore, shareholders’ ability to have an influence on the remuneration report will 
depend on the proportion of the votes which they hold. Shareholder voting is therefore 
predominantly aimed at institutional investors because they hold large numbers of shares 
in a company, much more than an ordinary shareholder. Institutional investors have an 
advantage over individual investors because they have the expertise needed to understand 
the remuneration report, and if not they will be capable of incurring the cost of hiring an 
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expert. Also, institutional investors are able to form a coalition with other institutional 
investors to use their votes for or against the remuneration report of the company. 
However, despite the concentration of equity ownership in the hands of institutions, 
shareholder voting on the directors’ remuneration report has not increased. Only a small 
proportion of FTSE 100 companies shares are held *Comp. Law. 146  by UK long-term 
investors. The majority of FTSE 100 companies’ shares are in the hands of overseas 
shareholders (as shown in Table 3) or short-terminist investors such as hedge funds.63 
 
Table 3: Beneficial ownership of UK shares by value (2014) 
 
Sector 
 
All companies 
 
Rest of the world 
 
53.8 
 
Insurance companies 
 
5.9 
 
Pension funds 
 
3.0 
 
Individuals 
 
11.9 
 
Unit trust 
 
9 
 
Investment trusts 
 
1.7 
 
Other financial institutions 
 
7.1 
 
Charities, churches, etc. 
 
1.2 
 
Private non-financial companies 
 
2.0 
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Public sector 1  
 
2.9 
 
Banks 
 
1.4 
 
Total 
 
100.0 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics — UK share ownership 2014 
 
Table 3 indicates that more than 50 per cent of UK shares are held by overseas 
shareholders, who may not be able to monitor directors’ remuneration in all companies 
because of the large number of companies they may have in their portfolio. Dong and 
Ozkan,64 studying institutional investors’ and directors’ pay in UK companies, found that 
there exist two classes of institutional investors, one dedicated and the other transient. 
Their findings showed that the dedicated institutional investors do restrain the level of 
directors’ pay and strengthen the pay-performance relationship. These dedicated 
institutional investors use their expertise and votes to monitor the management. The 
transient institutional investors make no appreciable difference either to the pay levels of 
the director remuneration or to strengthening the pay-performance relationship, indicating 
that they have failed to regulate director remuneration.65 
Shareholder pro-activism can greatly reduce the influence shareholders could have on the 
pay determination process in a company. This disengagement by the shareholders also 
reduces the importance of the voting powers vested in the shareholders on remuneration 
matters. Consequently, a binding shareholder vote may not be more effective than a 
non-binding shareholder vote, and the setting of directors’ remuneration would still be 
inappropriately regulated. There is no significant change in shareholders’ voting attitude on 
directors’ remuneration resolutions in the annual general meeting. This could be taken to 
mean that shareholders do not simply want to get involved in matters as complex as 
directors’ remuneration. 
 
 Complexity of directors’ pay package  
For shareholders to be able to make an informed decision on directors’ remuneration and to 
vote in the general meeting, they have to understand the remuneration report, how pay is 
set, the technicalities, and how it translates into the final amount that directors receive at 
the end of the year. The directors’ remuneration package is made up of several 
components,66 the main ones being base salary, annual bonuses and long-term incentive 
plans. A base salary is the contractual amount paid to a director on a monthly basis, and in 
the case of an executive director, it includes directors’ fees, even if these are decided and 
disclosed separately.67 This element is not related either to performance of the company 
or to the performance of the individual director.68 Base salary is a key component in 
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directors’ pay because most components of the remuneration package are measured 
relative to base salary. For example, Tesco Plc’s remuneration policy for annual bonuses is 
to award up to 250 per cent of base salary. 
Annual bonuses were and still are used as a motivation for directors to achieve a higher 
level of performance.69 Annual bonuses are obtained upon achieving a performance target 
set by the company for the directors.70 Bonus schemes provide directors with the incentive 
to perform better and therefore are regarded as a mechanism for improving directors’ 
performance. Director performance can be difficult to determine, but bonus remuneration 
must reflect some kind of performance criteria for it to be meaningful. The company would 
have to set a performance target which the directors would have to achieve, and a 
performance measure with which the performance would be determined. However, for the 
shareholders to understand annual bonuses and how they are set, they will have to 
understand performance measures, considering that there are many that exist. Having to 
understand all the performance measures and judging whether the company has chosen 
the appropriate measure and whether they have set the right target will require expert 
knowledge. Some of the shareholders can find the information overwhelming, and because 
they cannot understand it they decide to abstain from voting. *Comp. Law. 147   
There has been a massive increase in bonus payments over the years, ranging from 
practically nothing to millions of pounds.71 Directors can receive bonus pay that is more 
than 100 per cent of the base salary,72 although there are EU rules that have stopped this, 
primarily in the banking sector. Annual bonuses can have a massive effect on the total 
remuneration package of a director as they can increase directors’ remuneration 
significantly. For example, in 2013, Gulliver Stuart Thomson, the CEO of HSBC Holdings 
Plc, had a base salary of £1,250,000 and a bonus pay of £6,428,000, which was 514.24 per 
cent of his base salary.73 
Long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) take the form of cash or a grant of shares that become 
transferable to the director only upon attainment of certain performance objectives.74 
Companies use LTIPs as a means to encourage and reward long-term performance, and 
thus align the interest of the directors more closely with those of the shareholders.75 LTIPs 
require the fulfilment of certain performance criteria over a period of time.76 The difficulty 
with understanding LTIPs is based on how the performance targets are set and the 
performance measures used in measuring performance. For example, in 2003, HSBC 
Banking Group had an LTIP scheme that rewarded directors if the firm could clear a 
performance hurdle of earnings per share (growth 2 per cent above an average earnings 
per share rate) adjusted upwards for inflation in Hong Kong (50 per cent weighting), UK 
(35 per cent weighting), and the US (15 per cent weighting). If the hurdle was cleared, the 
number of shares distributed to the director would depend upon total shareholder return in 
a comparator group of nine companies (50 per cent weighting), a "top 20" of banks (25 per 
cent weighting) and an index of 300 other banks (25 per cent weighting). If the HSBC’s 
total shareholder return performance was above the 50th percentile of the composite 
group, the director received shares in full, with an additional 20 per cent of the full award 
if the performance was in the top quartile. Understanding the complexity of this LTIP 
required the shareholders of the HSBC to track the share prices of 329 companies to 
estimate the relative performance of HSBC’s total shareholder return in the past, which 
was a very difficult task that no shareholder would be willing to do, except maybe 
institutional investors.77 Shareholders would need to possess expert knowledge to be able 
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to understand this report or pay for an expert to read and interpret the report for them. 
 
 Drivers of directors’ remuneration  
One of the reasons why shareholders may not want to get involved in directors’ 
remuneration is because of the drivers of that remuneration. Shareholders are expected to 
have a good understanding of all the factors that drive directors’ remuneration so as to be 
able to make an informed judgment in the annual general meeting. Among the drivers of 
directors’ remuneration are globalisation and the director labour market, board 
independence and the remuneration disclosure requirement. 
The first factor to be discussed is globalisation and the director labour market. The 
globalisation of the labour market, business operations and capital markets produces 
incentives that result in a convergence in remuneration practices worldwide.78 Directors in 
the US are the highest paid in the world.79 This means that any non-US company facing US 
competitors, possessing US operations, employing a CEO capable of managing a US 
corporation or exposed to the US legal environment has incentives to align their pay 
practices with those of the US companies.80 The UK and other countries pay their directors 
less than their US counterparts; however, their interaction with their US market pushes up 
director remuneration levels. Gerakos et al.,81 studying 416 publicly traded UK companies 
over 2003–2007, found that UK firms that interact with the US market are influenced by US 
pay practices, with total remuneration increasing in firms exposed to the US market and 
the presence of US-based operations. They found that the total remuneration of these 
companies had a direct relationship with the percentage sales derived from the US market, 
with firms with greater sales using more incentive-based pay. 
It has been argued that the trade of UK companies with US companies puts pressure on the 
UK companies to offer similar pay packages to their directors to prevent them from taking 
up similar positions in peer companies with lucrative firms. However, a study by the High 
Pay Centre found out that only 0.8 per cent of UK companies recruited directors from 
outside the UK, while 80 per cent of the directors were promoted from within the 
company.82 Although the use of international talent is very limited, it might still have an 
impact on directors’ remuneration *Comp. Law. 148  levels. One reason why US directors 
are the highest paid in the world is because US directors’ pay packages are highly 
incentivised as opposed to non-US companies.83 
The growing internationalisation of the director labour market also accounts for increases 
in director pay packages.84 The international director community has produced examples 
of directors using their business skills in countries other than their own. This is very 
common in companies of dual/cross-listing in two or more share markets. Directors will 
generally want a remuneration package that is at least equivalent to what they can get 
elsewhere.85 Bebchuk and Fried86 viewed this design of directors’ remuneration packages 
as the result of opportunistic exploitation of managerial power. They suggested that 
directors’ remuneration was subject to manipulation by the directors, using the managerial 
labour market to justify their pay package. The study by Gregory-Smith and Main,87 
considering the participation constraint in the director labour market using a sample of 953 
UK companies over the period 1995–2008, demonstrated that directors are more likely to 
move company when their pay is low. The mobility of directors is more particular when 
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they are paid less than prevailing market conditions suggest is possible. The mobility of 
directors leads to increases in remuneration levels, with the greatest improvement falling 
on the directors that switch companies. For example, in 2010, Marc Bolland left his former 
company (Morrisons Plc) to join Marks & Spencer Plc after the latter offered him a more 
lucrative pay package of £15 million. In his first year, he was to receive at least £8.5 
million, a sum that included £7.5 million compensation for lost bonuses and shares that he 
would have received in his old job. On top of his basic salary, he could earn a bonus worth 
up to £2.5 million. The package also included an "exceptional" award of shares worth 
nearly £4 million.88 
The fear of companies losing top management directors as a result of the global director 
talent market can increase the level of director pay in the UK. For example, in 2012 the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) awarded its then CEO, Mr Hester, a £963,000 bonus that was 
regarded as excessive and undeserving (he eventually gave it back), on top of his £1.2 
million base salary. The company justified the bonus award by arguing that there was a 
real fear of losing Mr Hester and the rest of the board members had they been paid less.89 
However, a report by the High Pay Centre on the contrary found out that lower pay does 
not drive directors overseas, as 80 per cent of director appointments were promotions from 
within the company.90 
UK companies recruiting from the US will definitely pay more to attract, motivate and 
retain their directors, and this could ratchet up director pay. The reason why the UK would 
want to recruit directors from the US is because the US has a comparatively deep talent 
pool of directors, and UK companies might want to take advantage of highly talented and 
experienced directors.91 The study by Gerakos et al.92 found that UK companies with 
directors that have US board experience tend to pay directors more than companies 
without directors with that experience. The internationalisation of the labour market has 
caused a significant convergence in directors’ pay between the UK and other countries.93 
UK companies, as well as other non-US companies, may use the fear of losing their 
directors to defend and justify the significant increase in directors’ pay.94 
The second factor driving directors’ remuneration is board independence. Increases in 
director remuneration are also driven by a weak or compromised board, as they might give 
in to the directors’ demands for higher pay as opposed to an independent and competent 
board.95 In the UK, the board contains sub-committees that are responsible for different 
areas of the company. Among these committees is the remuneration committee. The 
remuneration committee is responsible for setting the pay of all directors and the chairman 
of the company.96 This committee should be made up of independent non-director 
directors (NEDs). The independence of the NEDs has been criticised, on the grounds that 
the appointment of NEDs is still largely in the hands of the board as a whole, even though 
the nomination committee is supposed to make the appointment process more transparent 
and independent.97 Furthermore, the articles of many companies (including the model 
articles98) allow the board to appoint a director, indicating that the board still *Comp. 
Law. 149  ultimately appoints the NEDs. In some cases NEDs are appointed by the 
management, and this makes them susceptible to management as they owe their pay to 
the directors.99 NEDs feel a sense of divided loyalty as they attempt to fulfil their fiduciary 
duty to the company while maintaining an amicable relationship with the directors as a 
result of whose opinion they are appointed to the board.100 The effect of this on directors’ 
pay will be an increase in pay levels as the NEDs try to please the directors and protect their 
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position on the board.101 
The last factor to be discussed that drives directors’ remuneration is remuneration 
disclosure. It has been argued by Iacobucci102 that the enhanced requirement for the 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration in the company’s annual report has been a significant 
contributor to pay increases. Shareholders will need to read many other companies’ 
remuneration reports to inform themselves about pay levels across other companies. This 
is because remuneration disclosure improves access to market comparator information for 
both the director and the board, and could strengthen directors’ bargaining power.103 
Disclosure requirements increase the pressure on directors to set pay packages that are 
more sensitive to the company’s performance.104 The remuneration committee uses 
directors’ remuneration data from different companies to make their own assessment of 
appropriate external relativities to benchmark their directors’ pay levels. Disclosure makes 
this data available, and each company aims to reward its directors at the median or upper 
quartile, which places autonomous pressure on the remuneration levels of directors in all 
companies. The media, newspapers and magazines always list the remuneration of the 
top-earning directors, and directors use this information to establish their respective 
expectations and negotiating stances.105 
 
 Conclusion  
Directors’ remuneration has been a contentious issue in the UK since the early 1990s. The 
Companies Act 2006 is reticent about the regulation of directors’ remuneration as it avoids 
involvement in the management issues of a company. The Companies Act 2006 makes 
provisions that place the responsibility for the monitoring and curbing of excessive 
directors’ remuneration on the shareholders. It vests the shareholders with a binding vote 
on remuneration policy and a non-binding vote on the remuneration report. Since 2002, 
when shareholders were given a non-binding vote on the remuneration report, they have 
consistently demonstrated a rather uninterested attitude. This can be demonstrated by the 
number of shareholders abstaining particularly from resolutions at the annual general 
meetings that are concerned with the remuneration report. Between the years 2002 and 
2013, shareholders had only non-binding votes on remuneration reports. Although it was 
only an advisory vote, companies reacted on the outcome of the votes to prevent the 
shareholders from voting the directors out of the company. Despite this outcome, 
shareholders were reluctant to use the powers they had to monitor and curb excessive 
directors’ remuneration. This non-involvement made the Government give the 
shareholders a three-year binding vote on remuneration policy, hoping to motivate the 
shareholders to become more involved. Since that time, voting results and shareholder 
involvement have not improved. Shareholders continue to abstain from voting on pay 
resolutions at the annual general meeting. The scepticism expressed by the Cadbury 
Committee in 1992 about giving shareholders powers to make decisions on directors’ 
remuneration has been confirmed. They predicted that most of the shareholders would 
simply abstain from voting, and abstention votes are very high in some companies, those 
votes mostly only recorded in resolutions on directors’ remuneration. This article suggests 
that the Companies Act 2006 should make basic provisions on directors’ remuneration 
because the shareholders will not be able to. The shareholders’ inability to monitor 
directors’ remuneration is a result of the complexity of the remuneration package and the 
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technicalities involved in determining pay, as well as the drivers of directors’ remuneration. 
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